Transparency is both a powerful idea and a technology of power associated with accountability, justice and democracy, which opposes the secretive and shadowy power of surveillance wielded by states and corporations.
Introduction
During the summer of 2012, filmmaker and digital rights activist Caroline Campbell and visual artist Nina McGowan used drones fitted with cameras to make a film offering new visual perspectives on Dublin city in the Republic of Ireland. Titled Loitering theatre, the appearances is also the realm of world-creation, which relates to Arendt's concept of 'natality' -the human capacity to begin something new -but this is a contingent and unpredictable process. Though each of us is a story that arises out of biological life, we are not the authors of our own stories -we cannot predict how others will interpret and respond to our words and deeds (1958: 184; see Haugaard 1992) . Power, freedom and visibility thus combine as a dialogical, contingent, and constitutive process.
Without going further, it could be argued that these very different approaches to power, freedom and visibility are incommensurable. In contrast to Arendt's 'phenomenological-existential sensibility' (Hayden 2014 : 7), Foucault's analyses historicize concrete apparatuses and regimes (from the French dispositif, see Foucault 1980c: 194-8) . To come back to the examples used earlier, Loitering theatre might be examined through the lens of Foucault's theory of panopticism, while it could be argued that Christopher Froome's actions are staged within the Arendtian space of appearances. Common to both of these examples however is the way they each submit to the dominant regime of power/knowledge and play the game of visibility on its terms. The question then is how to avoid this trap. I think Foucault and Arendt together can answer that question, and here I follow Villa's (1992) argument that they meet on the terrain of an 'agonistic theory of political subjectivity'.
Foucault once invoked this concept of agonism -from the ancient Greek agon, denoting public contests whereby rivals compete for pre-eminence (Kalyvas 2009 ) -to present 'power and freedom's refusal to submit' as a 'relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle [and] permanent provocation ' (1983: 222) . Arendt writes of power and freedom as acting in concert, which might be interpreted as consensual collaboration, but Arendt's concert is a 'web of human relationships' born from plurality, and it encompasses not merely collaboration but also 'innumerable conflicting wills and intentions ' (1958: 184) . Perhaps nowhere in her writings in this combative rendering of concerted action more in evidence than when she uses the ancient Greek polis to illuminate present concerns. Here Arendt also invokes the concept of agonism to elucidate an expressive form of political action whereby individuals strive to rise above each other through exemplary public performances (2005: 130, 1958: 41, 194, 199-206) . Importantly, Arendt also relates power/freedom to a very specific way of thinking about equality, which might serve as a corrective to neoliberalism's emphasis on competitive individualism. Judith Butler (2015: 52) makes the point succinctly when she writes that:
The 'I' is…at once a 'we', without being fused into an impossible unity. To be a political actor is a function, a feature of acting on terms of equality with other humans -this important Arendtian formulation remains relevant to contemporary democratic struggles…The exercise of freedom is something that does not come from you or from me, but from what is between us, from the bond we make at the moment when we exercise freedom together, a bond without which there is no freedom at all.
There are three things I want to draw down from these initial reflections. One is the agonistic imbrication of rivalry, struggle and cooperation -freedom as a practice spans all of these relations. The second -as noted by Butler -is that whether we meet as allies or rivals, in a democracy we engage with each other on the terrain of equality. Finally is the issue of visibility: Foucault's analyses of the gaze and Arendt's space of appearances combine as a lens -a means of practising immanent critique and a way of seeing beyond the 'is' to the realm of imaginable possibilities. Otherwise put, the agonistic tensioning of power/freedom is not a puzzle be resolved but is instead a generative feature of human existence, and might thus be characterised as a condition of possibility for staging onto-political struggle (Connolly 1995: 12) 5 . By this I mean struggles to imagine ways of being-in-the-world that can be actualised through disruptive and counter-normative practices (see Kester 2015; Khoo and Taylor 2016) . To frame power/freedom as a way of engaging in onto-political struggle is to draw Foucault and Arendt together within the space of a generative process of worldcreation.
Freedom is inevitably a matter of degree to the extent that the scope of possible action is conditioned and constrained by context-specific enclosures of power/knowledge, which in turn foreclose on other ways of practising freedom. These enclosures are not fixed and immutable however; they can be breached, or to speak with Zerilli (2011: 23) -this is a mode of action powered by 'imaginative acts of thinking and judging' that fold into the agon as a contest among equals. This is what is presently at stake in academia, because it is fast becoming a routine feature of academic life that anything short of optimal performance carries negative consequences for those who fall behind in the race to excel. Moreover, 'optimal' means exceeding the performance of peers and rivals in a competitive situation where performance can be, and is -as will be seen through comparison between sport and academia -augmented through pharmacological and technological enhancement.
In the next section I use the transparency/surveillance relation to examine power/freedom/visibility in the field of academia, moving from there in the subsequent section to the task of normative critique. What I am not going to do however is attempt to legislate on what should follow from this critique. My objective is simply to take up a critical vantage point on where we are headed, what the consequences might be, and -with the help of Arendt and Foucault -how we might go about straining freedom as we currently experience and practice it. This is a first step towards opening out the possibility of thinking ourselves and the world anew.
Competitive performance: transparency and surveillance as a credibility contest
To begin at the most general level, academia is currently being reconfigured through programmes of reform variously referred to as the new public management, new managerialism and performance management, all of which are anchored in the neoliberalisation of higher education (Giroux and Dawes 2014; Giroux and Giroux 2006) . In practice this entails the use of instruments and technologies that seek to make actions and outputs visible and verifiable by measuring and incentivising performance through various types of audit (Power 1997 ) as well as flexible or 'atypical' labour contracts (O'Hara 2015).
The idea of accountability (configured as transparency) is one of the drivers of this process, and is harnessed to objectives such as delivering value for money by rewarding effort and weeding out waste. Another driver is the technique of quality assurance. In Europe, quality assurance is built into the Bologna Process for cooperation in higher education, the aim of which is to establish a European Higher Education Area 6 . The European Network of Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) is the umbrella organisation for Bologna signatory countries, and in its mission statement the ENQA states that it is committed to 'the enhancement of quality and the development of a quality culture in higher education' 7 . To cut through the rhetoric, Bologna is a coordinated strategy to place higher education in the service of economic growth and global competitiveness (see ENQA 2015) . Though the strategy is framed as one of cooperation, quality is one of the ways that higher education institutions compete for market share by developing distinct brands and unique products.
What this boils down to, as argued by Slaughter and Leslie (1997) , is 'academic capitalism'. To borrow from Trottier's work on surveillance and social media (2015, pp. 535-6) , academic capitalism generates 'curious partnerships' that traverse the personal, the private, and the public. This is curious not simply in the way it connects public entities (universities) to personal data and commercial enterprises (discussed below), but also because there is a type of symmetry between those who manage and monitor others and those who self-manage. On one side is a drive to govern through quality review and evaluative monitoring on the part of policy-makers and university management teams, which has the effect -whether intended or not -of routinizing distrust and surveillance (Dardot and Laval 2013, pp. 215-54; Lipman 2006; MacLaren 2012; Shore and Wright 2000; Strathern 2000; Webb 2005 In 2010, on the eve of the Tour de France (a three-week stage race held during the month of July), the International Cycling Union (UCI), which is the world governing body for sports cycling, created an 'index of suspicion'. All 198 riders taking part in the race were assigned a number between one and ten, with a score of six or higher indicating an 'overwhelming' possibility of doping (Farrand 2011 Sluggett (2011, p. 398) -is the behaviour of athletes in response to these controls. In the name of transparency, many are trying to outdo each other in demonstrating commitment to 'clean' sport.
In the introduction I mentioned the British/Kenyan cyclist Christopher Froome as someone who exemplifies this trend. By continually raising the stakes through his very public demands for a more rigorous and intrusive testing regime, Froome is helping to institute a practice whereby his peers must follow his lead, which gives rise to what Møller and Dimeo (2014) refer to as a credibility contest. Innocence (the absence of a positive test for banned substances) is no longer enough. Instead, credibility is an ongoing accomplishment that necessitates public performances that go above and beyond the threshold of suspicion. Yet that threshold keeps moving in tandem with athletes' efforts to be fully transparent. This is not simply about fending off sanctions however, because credibility is a form of capital that converts suspicion into personal prestige.
Academia is also becoming a credibility contest, and in terms of how this articulates the relation between distrust and surveillance, it is analogous the arena of professional sport, but inversely. In the case of the athlete suspicion is aroused when an extraordinary performance exceeds what is deemed humanly possible. In academia by way of contrast, performance must exceed the norm and to be ranked as average is to be failing. It is in this sense that 'excellence' should be understood, because to excel is to exceed the achievements of others, whether at the level of individuals or rival universities. The experience of this persistent pressure to excel is conveyed extremely well by Ball (2003, p. 220) when he writes of the 'mechanics of performativity' and accountability in higher education -the ways in which academic labour is subject to a panoply of judgements, measurements, targets and comparisons, which combine to generate a situation characterised by uncertainty and instability:
…A sense of being constantly judged in different ways, by different means, according to different criteria, through different agents and agencies. There is a flow of changing demands, expectations and indicators that makes one continually accountable and constantly recorded. We become…unsure whether we are doing enough, doing the right thing, doing as much as others, or as well as others, constantly looking to improve, to be better, to be excellent.
It is perhaps worth pausing here to reflect on the pros as well as the cons of competitive performance as a way of rewarding effort. With respect to the public sector, it has been argued that this is a desirable alternative to past practices when it comes to ranking candidates for promotion, and that as a way of implementing the ideal of meritocracy, performance management is an improvement on practices that reward seniority (see Osborne As this culture of augmentation expands in scope it also escapes the grip of regulation. In sport it is regulated by anti-doping agencies, but as noted by Hoberman (2005: 17) 'modern societies that run on the principles of productivity and efficiency cannot credibly oppose techniques that boost the human organism in order to enhance its mental, physical and sexual performances'. One such cognitive enhancer is Modafinil (Provogil), a wakefulness drug designed to treat narcolepsy and easily available to buy online. Used to boost productivity and performance, Modafinil is reported to be 'gaining currency in the global academic community' (Tysome 2007) . If one person equates this with cheating another might see it as a way of gaining the competitive edge, and the use of these 'smart drugs' in academia have been defended on the grounds that they offer the means of 'levelling up' 9 (Shabbir 2014 ). Whether in sport or academia, natural ability can be enhanced, while successoriented commitment -will-power, focus and dedication -can also be augmented. In short, the meritocratic ideal of a level playing field belongs to a bygone era. The important difference between sport and academia of course is that academics do not need to fear the equivalent of anti-doping agencies. However the culture of augmentation is happening in other more mundane ways too, enabled by technologies to boost research 'footprint' and impact.
Visibility and the personal panopticon
Social networking sites for researchers such as Academia.edu and Research Gate are on an upward trajectory in terms of users, and this is also one way of becoming more 'Googleable'. Hall (2105, pp. 3-4) makes two important points in response to this trend. One concerns the source of revenue. In contrast to for-profit academic publishers that charge individuals and institutions to make content publically available, Academia.edu leverages data that is freely available on its platform. The second point brings me back to Trottier's idea of curious partnerships. Although academic research is increasingly reliant on private funding, the majority of academics are employed in publically funded higher education institutions, and Hall is surely correct when he makes the point that Academia.edu has a 'parasitical relationship to the public education system…academics are labouring for it for free to help build its privately-owned for-profit platform by providing the aggregated input, data and attention value'.
Whether one games the system or plays true, this way of boosting standing is staged within Arendt's space of appearances, yet this is very different to the world that she describes. We appear before others not just in the flesh, but also through our online presence -the 'personal panopticons' we construct and self-administer (Bauman and Lyon, 2013, p. 59). Our personal panopticons blur the distinction between transparency and surveillance, and this way of representing and communicating outputs and achievements reinforces the logic of academic capitalism in at least two ways: we ensnare ourselves in a business model fuelled by algorithmic surveillance, and we generate numbers that allow our digital-doubles to be compared and ranked, which in turn feeds back into the ranking of academic labour within the institutional setting. To come back to my earlier examples from the fields of art and sport, the personal panopticon is more or less continuous with Loitering theatredemocratising surveillance, and also with Christopher Froome's efforts to use data -numbers primarily -to offset scepticism and win public acclaim: the game of numbers is a credibility contest that democratises surveillance within the space of appearances. But this is also a case of Arendt's 'fiercely agonal spirit' whereby we freely participate in a contest driven by the logic of ranking and rivalry -a contest that distinguishes the best from the rest.
The personal panopticon accelerates the transformation of academia into a competitive arena which is configured as a race. This is not simply a race among winners and losers, it is also a race to remain in the race, to not fall too far behind, which is to be judged deficient and thus a liability rather than an asset to the organisation -only those who expect to fail or with something to hide would wish to remain in the shadows, and thus the generative relation between rivalry and suspicion continues to intensify. This is a field of power relations that extends from the macro-political level of state-policy and international trends in higher education, through the institutional level of managed and measured performance, to the micro-politics of personal panopticons. In short this is much more than a mode of control whereby power is exercised by managers over line-workers (or anti-doping agencies over athletes). Instead it is a highly decentred network of power relations which is governed through a regulated autonomy constructed and conditioned not just by technologies of control, but also by personal panopticons and peer relations.
The politics and poetics of open enclosures: re-imagining power and freedom …suspicion always attaches to mystery…for why should we hide ourselves, if we do not dread being seen? -Jeremy Bentham 1791 Everything that is, must appear, and nothing can appear without a shape of its own; hence there is in fact no thing that does not in some way transcend its functional use, and its transcendence…is identical with appearing publically and being seen -Hannah Arendt 1958
It is testimony to the influence of Foucault's theory of panopticism (1977) that Bentham has become a cardinal point of reference in the field of surveillance studies (Lyon 1994, pp. 67-79; Mathiesen 1997; Bauman 1998, pp. 51-4) as well as debates on transparency (Gaonkar and McCarthy 1994; Hood 2006) . In his essays on the poor laws, written during 1797/98, Bentham presents his thoughts on visibility in the form of a succinct statement: 'the more strictly we are watched, the better we behave ' (2001, p. 277 ). This applies not only to the inmates of his imagined panopticon prisons and poor-houses, but also to public officials and members of parliament (see Bentham 1791 Bentham /1843 . According to Bentham, visibility is a 'tactic' that must apply to each and all. Foucault's rendering of this -his theory of panopticism -boils down to this: 'He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power…he becomes the principle of his own subjection ' (1977, pp. 202-3) . Foucault could hardly have foreseen the extent to which we have indeed become the managers of our own subjection, and Bentham's axiom might be reformulated as 'the more strictly we are watched, the more intensely we compete to enhance our own visibility'.
Foucault once described panopticism as 'diabolical' because it is a web 'in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised ' (1980a, p. 156 whereby -as with the example of the drones in the introduction -resistance takes the form of counter-surveillance. Transparency and surveillance are locked together as a ratchet-like process, and depending on how one perceives this, or more importantly perhaps, depending on one's subject positioning, it may well be experienced as tyrannical as well as being diabolical. For Bentham the panopticon was as a safeguard against tyranny. It was a way of imagining a thoroughly decentralised and democratised machinery of power that would be 'supervised by society as a whole' (Foucault 1977, p. 207 ). Yet if there is no apparent means of escaping the eye of power other than to move into the shadows and thereby render oneself void or suspect, then perhaps we have succeeded in democratising tyranny. The question that follows is how to act in the face of this predicament?
Reprise: power and academic freedom
As noted from Foucault in section one above, power is inadequately understood if equated solely with coercion, repression, and prohibition. Power also produces in that power is constitutive of freedom as an agonistic arena of practice, and this in turn forecloses on other ways of making the imaginable 'appear' (to borrow from Arendt). It is in this sense that depoliticised technologies of power -such as metrics used to evaluate and rank research and researchers -can be said to produce regimes of truth whilst remaining deeply political (Foucault 1980b ). Otherwise put: to foreclose is also to enclose, but such enclosures are contestable. This gestures towards onto-political struggle which, as noted above, is a generative process of world-creation. Engaging in this type of struggle necessitates counternormative interventions that cut across the grain of the instituted regime of truth, thereby transfiguring socially-scripted enclosures of thought and imagination (Khoo and Taylor 2016). I will attempt to make this argument tangible by engaging with three key concepts threaded through the curious partnerships that connect the personal (panopticon) to the public (corporatized university) to the private (algorithmic enterprise): excellence, quality, and innovation.
Excellence: I have suggested that the dominant conception of excellence in academia is about exceeding the outputs, impacts and performances of rivals. There are echoes of the distant past in this feature of the present, and though written long before the enterprise society had come of age, Arendt's account of the 'fiercely agonal spirit' that pervaded the city states of ancient Greece can be used to recast the meaning of excellence today (1958, p. 41; 2005, p. 165). Arendt is here referring to political life in the polis, whereby excellence was a public performance of words and deeds in pursuit of distinction. In other words, to be excellent was to rise above one's peers, 'to show through unique deeds or achievements' that one 'was the best of all', or the best among equals (1958, p. 41) . However, and this is the point I wish to stress, this is an individuality that requires the presence of others and exists only in the context of that relational plurality. What is foreclosed upon and remaindered by the 'valueneutral' framing of value -metrics, rankings, impacts, and so forth -is the inexhaustible plurality of perspectives that harbours the capacity to generate an endless flow of new beginnings. To institute a 'singular experience' (Arendt 1958, p. 58 ) that disciplines plurality transforms difference into managed predictability, so that excellence comes to mean more of the same in larger quantities at reduced costs. An alternative way of thinking about excellence, as argued by Fendler (2012, p. 322) , is to exceed by 'pushing beyond current
limitations, beyond what is known or imaginable, and toward the realm of the "not yet"'.
Quality: Earlier I mentioned the Bologna Process as a driver of Quality Assurance in Europe, noting that though this is a coordinated strategy framed by the idea of collaboration, in practice it generates competition among higher education institutions competing for market share. With respect to research, quality is captured and communicated in the form of data generated by the algorithmic monitoring of research trends (discussed above), as well as evaluation protocols and procedures that rate and rank research 'outputs'. Outputs are selected as trending and/or excelling relative to others deemed to be of lesser quality, and as with elite sport, the search for marginal gains encourages a situation where gaming the system of evaluation can become the optimal strategy 13 . Solving that particular problem however would do little in terms of altering the power relations generated by incessant ranking and intense rivalry. Rancière's idea of 'the sensible' -the thinkable, sayable, doable -and the way this partitions those who count from those who have 'the part of no part' is apposite here (2004) 14 . In the research assessment exercise for example it is 'things' which are counted and discounted, valued and devalued, but these things are born from human endeavour. The process of objectification transforms the ethico-political substance of these practices into a technical task governed by rules and procedures concerning the measurement, evaluation and ranking of comparable entities. When things are counted and discounted in this way, then lives are also valued and devalued. collecting data through tried and tested methods, to reading the work of other theorists and analysts, learning through teaching, and borrowing insights and techniques from unrelated fields of endeavour. The idea of the single-authored four-star publication replicates the myth of the artist-genius, and this is reinforced by the personal panopticons that compete for individual prestige in the world of credibility metrics.
Innovation: This might be called the lesson from Mary Shelley -in the name of advancing science we create a monster that kills creativity, and we sustain the monster by giving it a name that serves as a surrogate for what has been lost. The name of the monster, and it is fast becoming a logic which is stretched across the social, is a mantra that swings like a pendulum between 'enterprise' and 'innovation'. For ease of presentation I will stick with innovation, and I will contrast this with creativity with the help of an example: the difference between a house painter and an artist who paints 15 . The house painter works to a script which is the equivalent of an architect's drawing 16 . The script might be produced by an interior designer or the owner of the house to be decorated, but either way the desired end product determines what will be done and how it will be done. Though this is skilled and knowledgeable work, the tradesperson is basically a tool in a managed process. In the case of an artist who paints - Crucially important here is that Picasso was not alone with his work. It was his lover Dora
Maar who used her camera to record the painting's evolution, and her presence must be seen as contributing to the process of production, just as the viewer's presence produces the meaning of the finished painting. To abstract slightly, whether the production process is anchored in the field of art or academia, unscripted labour is a dialogical process of 'collaborative emergence' (Sawyer 2004, p. 13) . This is the difference between creativity and innovation as a process that fuels the logic of enterprise, and here it might be worth recalling Foucault's words by way of shifting the focus from artistic production to academic freedom. In an interview conducted in 1982
Foucault was asked whether he was as a philosopher, historian, or structuralist. His answer exemplifies the difference between innovation and creativity, and is also striking when compared to current trends whereby academics are increasingly required to specify impacts and outputs before the research has even commenced:
The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning. imagination, but it disciplines these distinctly human 'inputs' through the accountancy practices noted above -dividing 'outputs' that count from others that count for very little 17 .
When peoples' jobs, security, futures are on the line, and when research outputs must have 'impact' in order to count, then it is inevitable that the monster will begin to condition what is done and how it is done. In short, innovation eviscerates the freedom to engage in creative endeavour.
Conclusion
To conclude I want to return briefly to Hall's (2015) analysis of Academia.edu, specifically his argument that the open access movement is in danger of being 'outflanked' by data-driven commercial enterprises. His choice of word is apposite, because this is indeed a strategic game of power, though it is not simply the open access movement that is being outflanked. A plurality of possible worlds (in the Arendtian sense) are also being outflanked. Yet to be outflanked is not equivalent to powerlessness (Haugaard 1997, pp. 205-18) .
Whether examined at the level of individuals or institutions, academic excellence is becoming a zero-sum game of distinction and rivalry, but this might be reconstituted as a positive-sum collaborative undertaking -and without subscribing to some type of antimeritocratic collectivism. This is one of the really important insights to be derived from Arendt's way of theorising the agon -the instruments that hammer academic labour into a game of numbers which is somehow supposed to reflect quality might be countered by an alternative constellation of values, whereby quality stems from equality rather than a vertical logic of ranking and rivalry. To emphasise the main point: this does not foreclose on contests that allow individuals to excel, but it does diminish the value of winning-at-all-costs. In turn the hegemony of innovation and enterprise might be destabilised by enacting an ethos of openness -a commitment to experimentation and an open process of creative inquiry.
As an approach to life and inquiry -as a way of practising freedom -the ethos of openness attributed to Foucault above compliments Arendt's concept of natality. We are conditioned by the world that we are born into, and the world in this Arendtian sense is a human artifice. Through our deeds and words we create a world that will outlast us and which will in turn condition those who are born after we are gone. But no one is conditioned absolutely; each person is a new beginning and all have the capacity to imagine and create the world anew -this is what powers onto-political struggle.
Ultimately this is a contest staged on the terrain of some of the oldest debates in social thought -structure and agency, theory and practice -but perhaps there is also a need to work across the disciplinary enclosures separating the (social) sciences from the arts. To some extent this is already happening through the collaborative projects of socially-engaged artists 
